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Introduction
In the past fi ve years the European Union (EU) seems to have suff ered from 
Eurosclerosis again. Th e EU has increasingly been contested, as witnessed by the 
referenda on the Constitutional Treaty in France, the Netherlands and Ireland, 
and by the criticism against the EU’s response to the fi nancial and economic cri-
sis. It seems that the ‘permissive consensus’ on the merits of the EU has ceased to 
exist and that the European integration project has reached the ceiling. However, 
despite the widespread malaise in the Union’s internal aff airs, its ambitions and 
initiatives on the international scene have grown considerably in recent years. Th e 
EU has played a leading role in the launching of a broad trade agenda under the 
World Trade Organization, it has successfully manifested itself as a climate leader 
in the post-Kyoto discussions, as a supporter of ‘eff ective multilateralism’ within 
the United Nations institutions, and as the world’s largest aid donor. Th rough 
its enlargement and neighbourhood policies, the Union eff ectively manages to 
transform political and social structures of the countries in its ‘near abroad’. A 
comprehensive European Security Strategy has been elaborated by the European 
Council and more than twenty civilian and military missions have been deployed 
in various parts of the world.
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A similar paradox can be noticed at the beginning of the 1970s. Th en too, the 
European project seemed to be faltering in the face of an economic crisis. Instead 
of an aggregated approach at the EC level, all Member States of the Commu-
nity choose the national path to avert the crisis. An atmosphere of ‘Eurosclerosis’ 
characterized the European political scene where supranational institutions were 
widely considered to be irrelevant. However, at the same time, the European 
Community started to develop a more global profi le in the period 1970-73 (Or-
bie 2008, 7).1 At a conceptual level, it was argued that Europe’s distinctive global 
role would not be based on traditional military power, but it would neverthe-
less be infl uential on the basis of its internal economic strength. Some idealistic 
thinkers imagined a ‘civilian power Europe’ that uses its economic leverage to 
disseminate the European model and values to the world (Duchêne 1972; 1973), 
while more critical scholars depicted the European Community as an ‘imperialist’ 
and ‘capitalist superpower’ that pursues old policies with new means (Galtung 
1973).
European policy-makers also started thinking aloud about the European Com-
munity’s position in world politics. In 1973 – the year of Henry Kissinger’s ‘Year 
of Europe’ initiative – the nine European Ministers of Foreign Aff airs formulated 
the ‘Declaration on European Identity’ in order to defi ne the EC’s relations with 
other countries and its position in world aff airs. Following Th e Hague Summit in 
1969, a mechanism of European Political Cooperation had been introduced. Th is 
involved a Europeanisation of the member states’ foreign policies, although still 
very modest. For example, the EC member states managed to coordinate their 
activities within the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe that was 
launched in 1973. Also in 1973, the fi rst enlargement with Ireland, Denmark and 
in particular the United Kingdom raised the Community’s international profi le. 
In 1974, the European Community was also the fi rst non-state entity to acquire 
the status of observer within the General Assembly of the United Nations and 
a range of other UN programs, commissions and organizations. Moreover, the 
seventies showed increased European activities in international environmental 
policies, for example through its role in the UN Stockholm Conference on Hu-
man Environment (1972).
Th e European Community also manifested itself in the trade and development 
nexus. It negotiated as a single actor in the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade ne-
gotiations, while weaving a dense web of trade and cooperation agreements at the 
bilateral level. Th e fi rst generation of cooperation agreements with the Southern 
and Eastern Mediterranean countries, signed in the 1970s, strengthened Europe’s 
1. Since the debacle of the European Defense Community in 1954, most European policy-makers had
abandoned the idea of a stronger political Europe in the world. Th e subsequent European Economic Commu-
nity (1957) would limit itself to economic integration at the internal level.
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clout towards the European neighbourhood. Moreover, its relations with the de-
veloping South were extended to Asia and Latin America with the establishment 
of a Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) granting unilateral trade prefer-
ences for these countries in 1971, and with a number of bilateral cooperation 
arrangements. But most importantly, the European Community negotiated the 
fi rst Lomé Convention with the group of African, Caribbean and Pacifi c (ACP) 
countries between 1973 and 1975. Th is was arguably the most comprehensive 
and progressive trade and cooperation agreement that has ever been concluded 
between a group of Northern and Southern countries.
Th erefore, we consider the fi rst Lomé Agreement as an interesting case to ex-
plore the European Community’s international pro-activeness in a context of Eu-
rosclerosis. In the next section, we will illustrate why the EC-ACP arrangement 
has often been seen as a revolutionary achievement. Subsequently, we will analyze 
to what extent this was indeed the case, based on a study of secondary literature 
and on original empirical research in the records. Th is will allow us to formulate 
some concluding remarks on the apparent paradox between global Eurooptimism 
and internal Eurosclerosis.
Th e revolutionary Lomé Convention
One of the most important and substantial projects the EC engaged in, while 
its internal integration was kept hostage by the economic crisis, was the Lomé 
Convention: a comprehensive partnership agreement between the EC and former 
colonies of the EC Member States in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacifi c. Th is 
agreement sought to provide a framework to structure the trade and aid relations 
between the EC and these ACP countries. When the negotiations towards the 
Lomé Convention were fi nished, the result turned out to be much more than 
just a standard trade agreement. It was called revolutionary, unique in history 
and a model other developed countries should follow in their relations with the 
developing world.2
François-Xavier Ortoli, the then President of the Council, called the conclu-
sion of the Lomé agreement ‘a major turning point in history of the international 
economic relations’. His colleague, the President of the European Commission, 
talked about ‘an agreement unique in the world and in history’. Th e chairman 
of the ACP, Babacar Ba, used the words ‘revolutionary agreement’ and the ma-
jor newspapers in the EC spoke of ‘one of the European Community’s greatest 
2. Regardless of its extraordinary features, it should be noticed that the Convention also had a long-lasting 
impact. Although the Lomé II (1980), III (1985), IV (1990), and IVbis (1995) agreements involved some 
modifi cations, the Lomé I model would basically shape the EU-ACP for more than 30 years. Th e Cotonou 
Agreement (2000) was a more substantial break with the past, although some clear traces to Lomé I can still be 
found (see e.g. Holland 2002; Hurt 2003; Babarinde and Faber 2005).
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achievements’ and ‘a new style of relationship between Europe and the Th ird 
World that is based upon equality and respect for reciprocal interests’. (Th e Cou-
rier 1975, 7,12, 16, 19)
Th e reasons why the Lomé Convention was perceived as a revolutionary land-
mark in the EC policy towards the developing countries are fourfold. Firstly, it 
was an amazing accomplishment to bring together such a large and diverse group 
of countries in a single agreement. Secondly, also the number of issues included 
in the partnership went beyond the standard trade agreement. Th irdly, the con-
tent and nature of some of the provisions, particularly the trade arrangements 
and mechanisms to stabilize export earnings, contributed to the innovative char-
acter. Fourthly, Lomé would establish a partnership ‘based on complete equality 
between partners’. Each of these features will be examined more closely to get a 
better understanding of how these aspects gave the Lomé Convention its unique 
image.
Th e fi rst reason why Lomé I could be seen as a watershed in the EU relations 
with the developing world is its geographical reach. Th e partnership was joined 
by the EC, which consisted of nine industrialized countries and 46 developing 
countries, united in the artifi cially created ACP group. Both the size and the 
geographical diversity of the developing country grouping were remarkable. With 
37 countries, the African continent was well represented. Th e Convention also 
included nine Caribbean countries and three islands in the Pacifi c. Together with 
the EC member States, 55 countries spread over four continents ranging from 
least developed to some of the richest in the world engaged in the far reaching 
Lomé partnership (Lister 1988, 60-61).3
Not only the number of participants, but also the issues covered by the agree-
ment were numerous. Besides a trade chapter, the convention included a chapter 
on export earnings from commodities (see below), which sought to establish a 
mechanism to stabilize the export revenues from important commodities. Fur-
thermore, a chapter on fi nancial and technical cooperation set forth the princi-
ples and criteria that would direct the distribution of the aid budget. Chapters 
on industrial cooperation, establishment, services, payment and capital move-
ment would boost the economic development of the ACP countries. In addition, 
through information sharing, technical and logistic support, the industrial sector 
would expand and product diversifi cation would be stimulated. Regulation on 
services, capital movement and investment could encourage the Foreign Direct 
Investments in ACP countries. Th e Convention also provided for the establish-
ment of several institutions that would seek to execute and implement what was 
agreed upon (Frey Wouters 1980, Grilli, 1993, p. 27). It is thus clear that the 
Lomé Convention dealt with a lot more topics than classic trade agreements. 
3. In comparison, there were about 80 members of the GATT at the time.
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From this perspective, one could even question whether the European Commis-
sion’s emphasis on trade-related, ‘behind-the-border’ issues in today’s trade ne-
gotiations is really a new phenomenon. Already in the mid-seventies, regulatory 
issues on services, investments, capital movements etc. were incorporated in EC 
trade agreements. Langham’s (2009) research shows that “the fusion of ethics to 
economics within ‘deep’ liberalisation agendas is nothing ‘new’ in the history of 
ACP-EU relations”.
A third feature that added to the revolutionary status of the Lomé Conven-
tion was the unique nature of the trade regime that was installed. Th e philosophy 
behind the GATT rules, as well as the previous Yaoundé Conventions between 
the EC and African countries, was that in principle both parties should open 
their markets for each other. Reciprocal trade liberalization would increase their 
economic competitiveness. Instead, the Lomé Conventions established non-rec-
iprocity. While the EC committed itself to opening up its market for products 
from the ACP countries, the latter had no obligations towards the EC: the ACP 
countries could freely choose the tariff s and duties they imposed on EC prod-
ucts.4 Article 7 of the Convention stipulated that
‘in view of their present development needs, the ACP States shall not be required […] to 
assume […] obligations corresponding to the commitments entered into by the Community in 
respect of imports of the products originating in the ACP states.’
Th e argument behind this provision was to give the ACP countries the pos-
sibility to protect their markets when their economies were not yet ready to 
compete with European exporters. Th anks to this non-reciprocal trade regime, 
ACP countries could enter the European market under more favourable condi-
tions than their non ACP competitors. Although the EC kept its right to impose 
import tariff s and quotas on ACP products that were subject to the European 
Common Agriculture Policy, European market access for agricultural products 
was still more favourable for the ACP than for other developing countries (Frey-
Wouters 1980, 46; Lister 1988, 76-77).
In addition to non-reciprocal trade, the Lomé trade regime also included 
more interventionist parts. Two mechanisms were set up to stabilize the export 
revenues from commodities that were of major importance for an ACP states’ 
economy: STABEX and the commodity protocols. In many developing countries 
one or two primary commodities made up more than half of the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) and therefore had a major impact on their export earnings. How-
ever, world market prices of primary commodities were (and are still) volatile. Th e 
instability and unpredictability of these prices created huge uncertainties about 
the incomes farmers could generate. It goes without saying that such economic 
4. Except for the obligations under the Most Favored Nations Principle.
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premises are detrimental to the economic development of a country, especially 
when you take into account that the vast majority of the population works in 
the agricultural sector. Th e fact that farmers cannot adjust their production and 
thus supply to the demand did not make things any easier. Farmers did not know 
whether they would earn enough to sustain their family; neither could they make 
the investment needed to maintain a competitive position on the world market 
since there was no certainty about future income. To counter this problem, the 
Lomé Convention established several mechanisms to stabilize the export revenues. 
STABEX (Stabilisation of Exports Earnings) provided for loans and grants for 
which the ACP governments could apply when a certain commodity fell below a 
reference point. If the prices of these commodities increased, the loans could be 
paid off . Products that qualifi ed for this mechanism were amongst others cocoa, 
coff ee, cotton, coconut and tea (Holland 2002, 36). Th e commodity protocols 
granted the ACP countries a set price for a fi xed amount of a certain commodity, 
regardless of the world market price. Such commodity protocols were established 
for sugar, bananas and rum (Grilli 1993, 31).
Because of the provisions on non-reciprocity and market intervention, which 
departed from the GATT philosophy at the time, the Lomé regime could be 
considered an alternative trade regime which is inspired by the New International 
Economic Order (NIEO) rather than the dominant liberal paradigm. Lomé was 
widely seen as a specifi c example of what an NIEO would look like in practice 
(Pass 1982, 20); some called it a “mini-NIEO” (Hveem 1980, 88-89). According 
to Grilli (1993, 42), the European Community has accepted the ‘more reason-
able’ NIEO demands with the Lomé Convention.
Th e fourth factor that gave Lomé its progressive name was probably the most 
distinctive feature of the Lomé Convention: a commitment to an equal part-
nership between Europe and the ACP (Holland 2002, 34). Previous relations 
between the EC and former colonies of the EC member states were largely based 
on a one-way policy: the EC outlined the main part of the trade and aid regime 
with little manoeuvring space left for the developing countries to change the 
conditions of the agreement. During the negotiations towards Lomé, however, 
both partners were seen as equal players with equal voices in the negotiations, ir-
respective of the diff erence in real economic, political and military power (Lister 
1988, 103).5
5. Th e idea of a true partnership was also refl ected in the structure of the institutions founded in the Lomé 
Convention. Although the new institutions were similar to the institutional design of the Yaoundé Convention, 
predecessor of the Lomé Convention, they were based on the EC’s commitment to an equal partnership. Th e 
ACP-EC Council of Ministers, composed of representatives from the ACP states, the EC member states and 
the European Commission, gathered annually to oversee the general scope of the Convention. Th e Commit-
tee of ambassadors assisted the Council of Ministers. Th e Joint Consultative Assembly consisted of an equal 
number of EC and ACP parliamentarians and could suggest recommendations or resolutions to the Council of 
Ministers. Th ese proposals had, however, no binding eff ect (Holland 2002, 35).
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Th e United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), at 
which developing countries had called for an NIEO, played an important role in 
building the self-assurance of developing countries. But besides this psychologi-
cal shift in power, also the real power of the developing countries had increased 
due to the commodity crisis that had developed in the fi rst half of the seventies. 
Prices of commodities were mounting at incredible speed, with oil as the most 
prominent example. Since these commodities constitute the most important part 
of the developing country exports, their economic power was growing signifi -
cantly (Brown 2002, 51; Grilli 1993, 23-27). Th e atmosphere during and the 
result of the Lomé negotiations mirrored these evolutions. Th e EC member states 
no longer saw the former colonies as their subordinate backyard, but treated the 
ACP as true partners with respect for their sovereignty. Although the impact of 
this evolution cannot be measured, it is clear that it infl uenced several aspects of 
the Lomé agreement. First and foremost, never before had the EC put such an 
emphasis on the equality between partners in a bilateral agreement. Numerous 
references in the text of the Lomé partnership point at the parity of the parties. 
Even in unoffi  cial documents this shift is noticeable: while at the beginning of the 
seventies the French permanent representative in the EU referred to the former 
colonies as their ‘clients’ in his informal correspondence with the Ministry of For-
eign Aff airs, a few years later they are called ACP or ‘Francophones’/‘Anglophones’ 
in these unoffi  cial briefi ngs.6
Putting Lomé in perspective
How did the EC succeed in concluding such an innovative and groundbreak-
ing agreement with such a large group of countries while the economic crisis was 
paralyzing the whole European Integration process? To answer this question, we 
take a closer look at the historical and international context as well as the nego-
tiating dynamics leading to the fi rst Lomé Convention.7 Th is leads to two quali-
fi cations of the ‘revolutionary Lomé’ thesis: (1) Lomé I was to a large extent also 
the continuation of previous policies by France and the United Kingdom towards 
their former colonies, and (2) these two EC member states have largely shaped 
the content and nature of the agreement through intergovernmental bargaining.
6. In a telex from February 1973, a few months before the Lomé negotiations begun, Burin Des Roziers, French 
ambassador in the European Union, reports that “La négociation de ‘Yaoundé III’ sera plus diffi  cile pour nous et 
pour les Britanniques si chacun cherche a défendre ses ‘clients’ au détriment de ceux de l’autre” (SGCI CEE, 14 Feb-
ruary 1973). Reports written in the subsequent years never mention the patronizing term “clients” to refer to the 
Francophone or Commonwealth ACP countries. Th is seems to indicate that the change in attitude towards the 
developing countries was not only paying lip service to the changing international discourse, but a true change 
in the minds of the European political elite.
7. Th is analysis is partly based on research in the offi  cial EU archives, the Belgian Diplomatic archive, and some 
private collections. It forms part of a Ph.D. research project (2007-2011) by Lotte Drieghe on this topic.
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Needless to say, the Lomé agreement did not appear out of thin air. Its roots 
go back to the very beginning of the European integration project. In 1957, 
when the six founding countries of the European Economic Community were 
negotiating the Treaty of Rome, France demanded that a solution be included 
for the special relations it maintained with the colonies. Th ese special relations 
provided for benefi cial and reciprocal market access between the colonies and 
the motherland. France wanted to ‘Europeanize’ this arrangement when joining 
the EC. Securing preferential market access to the EC market for the colonies, 
and thus keeping its infl uence in these countries, became a conditio sine qua non 
for the French to sign the treaty. Chapter IV of the Treaty of Rome established 
this preferential market access, along with an aid component8 for these colonies 
(Grilli 1993, 7-8; Frey-Wouters 1980, 13). When large parts of Africa became 
independent at the beginning of the sixties, chapter IV of the Treaty of Rome 
was replaced by an association agreement: the Yaoundé Convention, with the 
reciprocal market access and the aid budget being the most important aspects of 
the agreement. Th is convention was renewed in 1969 for another fi ve years. In 
1972, when the United Kingdom negotiated the accession conditions to join the 
EC, it also demanded a solution for the special relationship the UK maintained 
with its colonies, including a benefi cial market access for these commonwealth 
countries.9 Th e EC decided that the Commonwealth could join the association 
agreement between the EC and the former colonies of France. Th e Yaoundé 
II convention would expire in 1975, so after a transition period of three years 
former colonies of the UK and France could jointly negotiate the renewal of the 
Yaoundé Convention (Lister 1988, 61). No ambitious ideas about development, 
but rather historical relations and practical consideration brought together such a 
exceptionally large group of developing countries in one comprehensive partner-
ship agreement.
Besides the large number of participating development countries, the historical 
bond between EC member states and their former colonies also explains why the 
Lomé Convention included the progressive trade regime featuring non-reciprocal 
market access and stabilization mechanisms for export revenues (Drieghe 2009). 
Although never applied on such a scale, the export stabilization schemes were not 
new. Before the founding of the EC, the French government had established a 
8. A European Development Fund (EDF) was established, fi nanced directly by the EC Member States through 
donations. ‘Th e sharing of the burden of aid to associated countries and territories was [thus] also the inevitable 
result of political negotiations among members (Grilli 1993, 83).’ Today, this intergovernmental setup is still 
the main instrument of the EC development cooperation with the ACP.
9. Th e Belgian ambassador Rothschild, who was stationed in London during the Lomé negotiation talks, re-
ported to the Belgium Ministry of Foreign Aff airs that “le gouvernement travailliste [the British government] 
s’était engagé à resserrer les liens du Commonwealth et à s’eff orcer que les pays members de cet organisme jouissent pour 
leurs exportations d’un accès maximum au marché commun.” (Archives diplomatiques belges, 14 May 1974)
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mechanism to stabilize the export revenues of its colonies: products from overseas 
territories were exempted from quota and tariff  restrictions and some products 
were granted a fi xed price on the French market, higher than the world market 
prices. (Dodoo and Kuster 1977, 17). Th e UK had also set up a mechanism to 
stabilize the export earnings of a commodity that played a key role in many com-
monwealth economies: sugar. In the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, the UK 
agreed to pay a fi xed price for sugar from the Commonwealth countries, regard-
less of the world market price, until a quota was reached (Dickson and Ndhlovu 
2002, 26). During the accession negotiations between the EC, the UK, Ireland 
and Denmark, the British negotiators asked for an arrangement between the EC 
and the Commonwealth that would replace their sugar agreement, since the UK 
could no longer determine its own market access conditions. After the transition 
period of three year during which the UK was permitted to keep up its bilateral 
trade arrangement with Th e Commonwealth, a new sugar regime was put forth 
in the Lomé Convention: the sugar protocol. However, since the sugar protocol 
would mostly benefi t the Commonwealth countries, France demanded that a 
similar system be set up for commodities imported mainly by Francophone colo-
nies.
‘Ils [the Francophone ACP countries] considèrent qu’ils feraient un marché de dupes en 
se prêtant à un règlement prématuré de la question de sucre. Ils considéreraient en fait comme 
un abandon de notre part [the French delegation] de nous prêter à un accommodement sur le 
sucre, dut-il être favourable à nos producteurs, sans le lier expressément à un accord d’ensemble 
sur les produits de base. Les arachides sont aussi importantes pour Sénégal que le sucre pour la 
Jamaïque, m’ont-ils dit.’10
Th e other EC member states where not prepared to extend these intervention-
ist commodity protocols to other products besides sugar, rum and bananas, partly 
because of the costs these systems entailed. Instead, the less far-reaching STABEX 
system was put into place. As noted above, this mechanism did aff ect the market 
price, but provided for loans and grants ACP countries could apply for when the 
world price for certain commodities fell below a reference point.
In an unoffi  cial statement, the UK ambassador M.R. James makes it crys-
tal clear that negotiations on export stabilization mechanisms were nothing but 
intergovernmental horse trading: ‘Our fi nal agreement on any scheme for oth-
er commodities will depend on the satisfactory arrangements being made for 
sugar.’11 And while the commodity scheme should be ‘modest and have a fi nan-
cial ceiling’, ‘the arrangement for Commonwealth sugar should provide […] ac-
10. SGCI CEE, 2 July 1974.
11. Archives diplomatiques belges, 20 June 1974.
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cess [to the European market] on fair terms for at least 1.4 million tons of sugar 
from the developing Commonwealth from 1975 onwards.’12
Th e introduction of non-reciprocal trade relations also resulted from inter-
governmental bargaining between the EC Member States. France, which was 
supported by Germany13, Belgium, Italy, Luxemburg and the Commission, de-
manded a reciprocal trade regime, through the creation of a Free Trade Area. Th e 
French government feared that the introduction of non-reciprocal and preferen-
tial market access would destabilize relations with their former colonies, because 
this would violate the multilateral trade rules of the GATT. Th is violation would 
in turn make the EC vulnerable to contestation within the GATT.14 Another 
explanation for the French position is the fact that requesting a non-reciprocal 
trade system would weaken the bargaining position of the Francophone devel-
oping countries, the French delegation’s allies in the Lomé negotiations. Unlike 
the Commonwealth countries, the EAMA (États africains et Madagascar associés) 
already traded with the EC under a reciprocal trade regime which gave them a 
superior starting position in the negotiations. Abandoning this reciprocity would 
take away this advantage for two reasons. Firstly, the Francophone ACP countries 
would have to change their trade policy towards the EC, while the Common-
wealth could simply keep theirs. Secondly, choosing a non-reciprocal market ac-
cess would mean that the EAMA countries would ask the EC a benefi cial market 
access, while off ering nothing in return. In other words, they would become the 
requesting party in the trade bargaining, depending on the good will of the EC 
to get their preferred trade regime. Th e EAMA acknowledged these problems and 
supported France in its plea for a reciprocal trade regime.15 Besides, France also 
wanted to preserve its benefi cial access to some relatively important EAMA mar-
kets. However, these economic considerations were of minor importance: once it 
12. Archives diplomatiques belges, 20 June 1974.
13. In the course of the negotiations, Germany changed its view on the reciprocity debate and sided with the 
UK, supporting the establishment of a non reciprocal trade regime.
14. Th e following citations from communication between the French foreign aff airs ministry and the Coreper 
representative point out that the stability of the trade regime is of major importance for France:
« La réciprocité, c’est le Problème de fond le plus important. S’il n’y pas zone de libre-échange, au moins en principe, 
donc réciprocité, on ne voit pas ce qui fonderait les relations privilégiées avec les pays concernés. La porte serait ouverte 
au mondialisme. » (S.G.C.I. CEE, 1973)
« Il s’agissait de se mettre d’accord sur un régime des échanges qui soit contractuel, et par conséquence inattaquable sur 
le plan juridique. Or la Commission, dans son mémorandum d’avril 1973 (le « mémorandum Deniau ») avait exposé 
que seul le régime de la zone du libre-échange répondait à ces conditions. »
« Les délégations les plus attachées à la stabilité du régime des échanges à la spécifi cité de l’association, [sont] les délé-
gations belge, italienne et française ». (SGCI CEE, 8 July 1974)
15. A quote in a communication of the French EC representative, Burin Des Roziers, to the French Ministry in-
dicates that the Francophone ACP states did not support the offi  cial position of the ACP group, but preferred a 
simple renewal o f the Yaoundé Convention: ‘Ils [les AASM) n’attachent guère d’importance aux déclarations qu’ils 
ont laissé prononcer par les Anglophones au nom des ACP. Ce que souhaitent les Francophones, d’après M. Coulibaly, 
ambassadeur de la côte d’ivoire, c’est le renouvellement de la Convention de Yaoundé.’ (SGCI CEE, July 2, 1974)
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became clear that the maintenance of the reciprocal trade regime would not be a 
walk-over, the French government dropped their demand for a de facto reciprocal 
market access. Instead, they pleaded for an Free Trade Area in theory for the sake 
of stable trade relations, but without the inclusion of any obligations towards the 
ACP concerning their market access.
Th e UK, on the other hand, followed by Ireland, the Netherlands and the 
Commonwealth pleaded for a non-reciprocal trade regime. Unlike the relation-
ship between France and its colonies, the UK’s relationship with the Common-
wealth was based on a less rigid structure, recognizing state sovereignty as a core 
principle. Unilateral and non-reciprocal trade relations would give more fl exibil-
ity to outline trade arrangements according to specifi c needs and wishes, without 
any restrictions created by the establishment of a free trade agreement. Th e fol-
lowing paragraph from a report of M.R. James, UK ambassador, on the Lomé 
negotiations describes the viewpoint of the UK delegation on reciprocity:
‘As Mr. Callaghan said in Luxembourg on 4 June, it is important that the Community 
should respect the developing countries’ wish to avoid trade reciprocity. Th ere must be no obliga-
tions on associates to provide the Community with tariff  preferences in return for the preferences 
they enjoy in the Community market.’16
Besides, non-reciprocity would diminish the bargaining power of the ex-
perienced associates, the Francophone states, in favour of the newcomers, the 
Commonwealth countries: whereas the former colonies of France already traded 
with the EC on a reciprocal basis under Yaoundé, the Commonwealth would be 
obliged to adjust their market access. Establishing a unilateral and non-recipro-
cal trade regime would take away the advantage of the Francophone developing 
countries and place the two groups on a more equal footing.17
Th is debate almost reached an impasse in negotiation, but a few days before 
the Kingston ACP EC ministerial conference took place in July 1974, the issue 
was settled when France, Belgium and Italy gave in on one condition: the trade 
regime should have a contractual basis, so that it would have a secure footing 
which could not be altered as easily as a unilateral Council decision on market 
access.
16. Archives diplomatiques belges, 20 June 1974.
17. Th e French Ambassador in the Coreper explains why the UK pleads for non-reciprocal market access: ‘Les 
EAMA [former Yaoundé countries] partent dans cette négociation avec deux atouts qui les mettent dans une meil-
leure position que leurs homologues du Commonwealth : d’une part, ce sont les ‘associés de la première heure’ et le 
traite d’adhésion lui-même leur garantit le maintien de leur ‘acquis’, en termes suffi  samment précis pour être effi  caces. 
D’autre part, les EAMA donnent à la communauté des préférences inverses [i.e. reciprocal trade], et ne sont donc pas 
de simples quémandeurs : ils ont donc, sur ce point une position de départ plus forte que ceux qui voudraient don-
ner le moins possible tout en prétendant obtenir autant qu’eux. Il est des ces conditions, assez naturel de la part des 
Britanniques de chercher à diminuer ces avantages dont bénéfi cient les EAMA dans la négociation’ (SGCI CEE, 14 
February 1973).
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In summary, the ‘revolutionary’ nature of the fi rst Lomé agreement should 
be put into perspective. Firstly, the Lomé Convention was less innovative than 
sometimes assumed. A closer look at the historical precedents shows that it rather 
continues the member states’ previous bilateral relations at the European level. 
Secondly, Lomé I was the result of intergovernmental bargaining between the 
EC member states, in particular France and the United Kingdom. In contrast, 
the European Commission has not played an autonomous role: it followed these 
member states’ preferences rather than pursuing an external policy agenda on its 
own. Despite its putative ‘commodity power’, the infl uence of the ACP group 
was also limited; or more precisely: the interests of the African and Common-
wealth ACPs were defended within the EC by their ‘patrons’ France and the 
United Kingdom, respectively.18
Conclusions
Th e fi rst Lomé Convention between the EC and the ACP has often been 
hailed as a groundbreaking change in North-South relations. With hindsight it 
might indeed have been the most generous and innovative trade/aid arrangement 
ever off ered by a group of developed countries.19 Th is article has highlighted the 
specifi c features of Lomé I: its geographical diversity, its comprehensive scope, 
the unique nature of the trade regime, and the partnership principle. However, 
we have also shown that many of the so-called new elements are less revolution-
ary than they appear at fi rst sight. Provisions on non-reciprocal market opening, 
export stabilization schemes, and commodity protocols already existed before the 
agreement was negotiated. While the Treaty of Rome entailed the Europeaniza-
tion of the preferential trade relations of France, the fi rst Lomé Convention con-
stituted a European compromise between French and British trade arrangements 
with their former colonies.
However, the Europeanization that took place through this comprehensive 
trade and aid arrangement was the result of pre-existing systems, and mainly 
driven by France and the United Kingdom. Two observations confi rm an Inter-
governmentalist reading of European integration in the 1970s: fi rstly, the two 
member states, France and the UK, basically shaped the Lomé I agreement in 
accordance with their economic and geopolitical preferences. Secondly, the Eu-
ropean Commission only facilitated the negotiation process and did not pursue 
18. Interestingly, Ravenhill (1985, 36-37) characterized Lomé as a ‘collective client – patron’ relationship be-
tween the ACP and the EC.
19. Th e most progressive elements of Lomé I had been eroded through the subsequent Lomé Conventions, and 
abandoned with the Cotonou Convention. Th e EU’s current trade arrangements with the ACP group – con-
sisting of Economic Partnership Agreements and the ‘Everything But Arms’ initiative – are less innovative and 
more in line with the rules of the World Trade Organization (see Arts and Dickson 2004; Orbie 2007).
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an agenda on its own. Our main thesis that Lomé I was not a novel project of the 
European Community, but rather a continuation of the largest member state’s 
policies on a European scale, seems to be in line with the atmosphere of Euro-
sclerosis in the 1970s. After all, member state preferences are in the driving seat, 
determining the content and nature of policies at the European level.
Of course, these fi ndings also resolve the observed paradox between internal 
Eurosclerosis and international proactiveness. Our interpretation of the fi rst Lomé 
Convention as the Europeanization of French and British trade arrangements 
with former colonies, which also qualifi es the role of the European Community 
as well as the ACP countries, confi rms Intergovernmentalist interpretations of 
the European project in the 1970s. However, it should be emphasized that the 
establishment of the fi rst Lomé Convention may have started a path-dependent 
process whereby the European Community has gradually assumed a more impor-
tant role, for example through its role in the implementation of the agreement, 
and the management of STABEX and the commodity protocols. Th e European 
Commission has arguably played a more important role in the subsequent Lomé 
Conventions and in the recent Cotonou Agreement, which has led to Economic 
Partnership Agreements between the EU and ACP countries. Since the Lomé I 
Convention, the European Community has acquired a competence to deal with 
trade-aid arrangements towards the ACP (although its ‘development-friendliness’ 
is not less contested than in the 1970s).
Finally, it should be noticed that the revolutionary presentation of the fi rst 
Lomé Convention can be linked to the legitimacy crisis inside the EU. As noted 
by the Council, “Le succès de Kingston [an EC-ACP ministerial meeting] est égale-
ment un élément très important à un moment où la communauté cherche à raff ermir 
sa cohésion à l’intérieur et à s’affi  rmer davantage à l’extérieur.”20 International ambi-
tions also serve as a means to establish cohesion inside the European Community. 
Th is hypothesis could also shed light on the European Union’s current ambitions 
on various fronts, again in times of Eurosclerosis.
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Abstract
This article examines the dynamics leading to the ﬁ rst Lomé Convention between the EC and the for-
mer colonies of its member states. In 1975 the EC and the ACP (African, Caribbean and Paciﬁ c) countries 
managed to conclude a comprehensive trade and development agreement, despite the period of eurs-
clerosis and economic crisis. This article aims to explain this apparent paradox. First, we examine why 
Lomé has been perceived as a revolutionary agreement. In this respect four features of the agreement are 
elaborated: (1) its broad geographical reach, (2) its wide scope, (3) the development friendly nature of its 
trade regime, and (4) the EC’s commitment to an equal partnership. Subsequently, we analyze the EC’s 
motives to include these distinguishing features in the Convention. Based on a research in the EU records 
and some private collections, this study comes to the conclusion that this ‘revolutionary’ agreement was 
not the result of ambitious ideas about development, but stemmed from historical relations and practical 
consideration. Lomé I was to a large extent the continuation of previous policies by France and the United 
Kingdom towards their former colonies, and these two EC member states have largely shaped the content 
and nature of the agreement through intergovernmental bargaining. However, in times of eurosclerosis 
it might be useful to afﬁ rm Europe as an ambitious international actor as a response to the internal legi-
timacy crisis.
Résumé
Cet article examine les dynamiques menant à la première Convention de Lomé conclue entre la Com-
munauté européenne (CE) et les anciennes colonies de ses États membres. En 1975, la CE et les pays dits 
ACP (pays d’Afrique, des Caraïbes et du Paciﬁ que) arrivent à conclure un accord exhaustif de coopéra-
tion commerciale et de développement, en dépit de l’eurosclérose et de la crise économique vécues à ce 
moment. Cet article vise à expliquer ce paradoxe apparent. En premier lieu nous examinons pourquoi 
Lomé a été perçu comme un accord révolutionnaire. À cette ﬁ n, nous élaborons quatre caractéristiques 
de l’accord : (1) sa large étendue géographique, (2) son envergure importante, (3) le développement de 
son régime commercial et (4) l’engagement de la part de la CE de forger un partenariat à part égale. 
Ensuite,  nous analysons les raisons de la CE d’inclure ces caractéristiques distinctes dans la Convention. 
Basée sur une recherche dans les archives de l’UE et dans quelques collections privées, cette étude aboutit 
à la conclusion que cet accord “révolutionnaire” ne résulte pas d’idées ambitieuses au sujet de dévelop-
pement, sinon qu’il provient de relations historiques et de considérations pratiques. En majeure partie, 
Lomé I représente la continuité des politiques antérieures de la France et du Royaume-Uni vis-à-vis de 
leurs anciennes colonies et ce sont justement ces deux États membres de la CE qui contribuent largement 
à façonner le contenu et la nature de l’accord à travers des négociations intergouvernementales. Quoi 
qu’il en soit, en époque d’eurosclérose, il paraît utile d’afﬁ rmer la position de l’Europe en tant qu’acteur 
international ambitieux comme réponse à la crise interne de légitimité.
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